



MASTER DIRECTIVES FILE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
III MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, FMF
UNIT 35601
FPO AP 96606-5601

ForO 5511.5F

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31 OCT 2000

FORCE ORDER 5511.5F

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) PROGRAM

Ref: (a) DCID 1/21
(b) CSP-1A
(c) DODINST 5240.5
(d) SECNAVINST 5500.31A
(e) MCO 5511.20
(f) Tri-Service Agreement for TSCM dtd 28 Mar 77

Encl: (1) Procedures in the Event of Detection or Suspicion of
a Technical Penetration
(2) TSCM Support Request Guidelines

1. Purpose. To implement references (a) through (f), which establish policy, standards, criteria, and guidance for the Marine Corps and Department of the Navy (DON) Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Programs respectively. This Order provides guidance for requesting, conducting and reporting TSCM services within III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).

2. Cancellation. ForO 5511.5E.

3. Background. Protection of classified information from technical surveillance is the responsibility of every commander. The TSCM program augments the commander's overall security program and identifies technical and physical security vulnerabilities and provides recommendations to correct such deficiencies. Enclosures (1) and (2) of reference (d) address physical security measures and the special threat posed by telephones and related equipment within secure areas.

4. Policy. The Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force (CG, III MEF), through the AC/S G-2, has operational control of the III MEF TSCM Program.

a. Upon validation of requirements by the III MEF (AC/S G-2), the Commanding Officer, Third Intelligence Battalion (CO, 3d IntelBn) will be tasked, via the Commanding Officer, MEF Headquarters Group (CO, MHG) with conducting TSCM operations.

b. Upon approval and direction by the CG III MEF, 3d IntelBn may provide TSCM services and support to non-FMF commands when requested by the Commander, Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

c. Submit all off-island requests for TSCM support by III MEF units to CG, III MEF (Attn: G-2) for validation and forward to the Commander, NCIS for action as appropriate in accordance with current cross-servicing agreement, reference (f).

d. The CO, 3d IntelBn has direct liaison authority with Commander, NCIS (Code 26B) for technical matters.

e. Upon receipt of validated tasking for TSCM support, the CO, 3d IntelBn will schedule support. First priority will be to Fleet Marine Force commands, followed by Marine Corps non-FMF commands, and then commands of other services.

5. TSCM Personnel and Training. The nature of TSCM, as a specialized counterintelligence function, requires personnel who possess extensive knowledge in investigative, electronic, and construction skills. This combination of talents is necessary to successfully conduct the complex and detailed operations associated with TSCM services. Only DOD-certified TSCM specialists will conduct these services.

6. Discussion. Specific criteria are used to select spaces and facilities requiring TSCM support. Additionally, operational security considerations must be taken into account before, during, and after TSCM services. Such criteria and considerations are:

a. Selection of Spaces Requiring TSCM Support. Exercise selectivity in identifying spaces to receive TSCM support due to the cost of technical manpower, travel and equipment. The following criteria determine TSCM support requirements:

(1) Basic Criteria. Request TSCM support for those spaces in which discussions at the Secret level or above routinely take place. Such spaces must also afford continuous 24 hour access controls to maintain the validity of the service. Enclosure (1) of

reference (d) contains guidance relative to physical security matters. Such facilities are those outlined in references (a) and (b).

(2) Conferences. TSCM survey and/or in-conference monitoring may be requested for conferences and other such meetings of a classified nature in facilities/spaces not open to the general public, which afford good audio and physical security, and when information to be discussed is classified Top Secret. Requests for TSCM surveys of theaters, auditoriums and unsecured classrooms will not normally receive approval. Sufficient personnel access controls and physical security are essential; without them, TSCM surveys foster a false sense of security.

(3) New/Renovated Facilities. Facilities will receive TSCM support once all construction is complete, the spaces occupied, and security measures are in effect. To assist in determining required physical security measures, preconstruction liaison with the CO, 3d IntelBn is encouraged.

(4) Automobiles, Ships and Airplanes. TSCM support for such vehicles will not be conducted unless justified by extraordinary circumstances. Reference (d), paragraph 6.a.5 pertains.

(5) Equipment. Equipment such as telephones, radios, typewriters, cassette players, etc., introduced into secure areas will meet the requirements of references (a) and (b). Equipment will be inspected after it has been introduced into the facility. Such inspections will normally be conducted on the next scheduled TSCM survey unless unusual circumstances dictate otherwise.

(6) Recurring Support. No facility qualifies automatically for routine recurring TSCM support. Once an area has been subjected to a fully instrumented survey, the results are valid as long as the security integrity of the facility is maintained. Recurring service will be provided upon validation by III MEF (AC/S G-2), based upon a documented threat vulnerability assessment completed by the CO, 3d IntelBn in accordance with paragraph 6.b of reference (d). Request support when:

(a) There is evidence suggesting an area has been technically penetrated.

(b) Extensive construction, renovation, or structural modifications required unescorted access by uncleared individuals.

(c) Unauthorized personnel have gained uncontrolled access to the facility.

b. Operational Security (OPSEC). TSCM services are specialized counterintelligence investigations and as such, are particularly vulnerable to compromise. All commands which receive TSCM services must implement OPSEC measures to ensure the success of the countermeasures effort. For this purpose assume, until the survey indicates otherwise, that an eavesdropping device is actually in place. Should discussions concerning pending support take place within the space, the device would most likely be removed prior to the survey and later reinstalled, or simply switched off remotely. Under such circumstances the probability of surfacing an eavesdropping device is diminished greatly. For this reason, no discussion or verbal comments concerning pending TSCM support shall take place in the spaces of concern, nor shall discussions or verbal comments take place during the survey. If a compromise occurs, TSCM specialists will immediately terminate the support being provided and report the circumstances which compromised the TSCM support to the III MEF G-2. Likewise, telephone requests or discussions of scheduled TSCM support are considered compromised unless conducted over secure voice systems outside the facility to be serviced.

c. TSCM Support Requests. Do not discuss such matters over unsecure telephones or telephones located in facilities/rooms pending or scheduled for TSCM support; reference (e), para E.2. pertains. Should a command discover a clandestine listening device, follow the guidance in enclosure (1). To request TSCM support, follow the guidance in enclosure (2).

d. Reporting. Results of TSCM services conducted for III MEF Major Subordinate Commands will be reported to the requesting command, via the CG, III MEF. Results of TSCM support conducted for non-FMF commands will be reported to the requesting command via the CG, III MEF and Commander, NCIS.

e. Budgeting. Budgeting for TSCM equipment maintenance and the procurement of TSCM expendable supplies is the responsibility of the CO, 3d IntelBn. Budget requests will be submitted to the CG, III MEF (Comptroller).

f. Maintenance. Electronic Maintenance Company, 3d Force Service Support Group will provide calibration services, within its capability, for the TSCM suite of equipment held by the CO, 3d IntelBn. Equipment needing repairs beyond the scope of local capabilities will be forwarded to U.S. Army Material Command, Intelligence Material Directorate, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-5315.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. L. Booker Sr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

J. L. BOOKER, SR.
Chief of Staff

Distribution: List II

Procedures in the Event of Detection or Suspicion of a Technical Penetration

1. Should a command discover an actual or suspected clandestine surveillance device, take the following actions:

- a. Secure the area to preclude removal of the device.
- b. Conduct no discussions of the discovery within the space where the device was found.

- c. Make no attempts at removal of the device.

2. The command will report the discovery immediately to the AC/S G-2, III MEF by immediate precedence SECRET message or other secure means. Do not discuss the matter over unsecure telephones or telephones located in the space where the device was found. The report should include the following information:

- a. Time and date of discovery
- b. Area, installation, or facility involved.
- c. Specific location within the facility where the device was found.
- d. Identity of device by type (e.g. wire, microphone, modified telephone, RE transmitter, etc.) if known.
- e. Method of discovery.
- f. Estimate as to whether the hostile intelligence service was alerted to the discovery.

3. Information concerning the discovery of an actual or possible penetration shall not be released to other persons until authorized by the CG, III MEF.

ENCLOSURE (1)

TSCM Support Request Guidelines

1. Forward all requests for TSCM support within III MEF to the AC/S G-2 for validation and subsequent referral to 3d IntelBn for action. By 1 December each year, Major Subordinate Commands are requested to identify those facilities requiring TSCM support for the coming calendar year.
2. In accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.4B, classify all requests for TSCM support SECRET. Commands should correct weaknesses identified during previous TSCM services.
3. All requests for TSCM support should include the following information:
 - a. Type of support requested (e.g. TSCM survey, TSCM inspection, in-conference monitoring, pre-construction assistance, etc.).
 - b. Complete identification of the area requiring support, to include name of the facility, room number, and address.
 - c. Square footage of the area.
 - d. Identity and telephone number of the command point of contact.
 - e. Date and serial number of last TSCM report, if any.
 - f. Clearance requirements for TSCM support personnel.

ENCLOSURE (2)